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[Abstract] With its special character in relation to both institutional design and policy 
content, the EU is often classiﬁed as a ‘post-modern’ security actor. What does this actu-
ally mean? What kind of capabilities does a post-modern actor have? This article focuses 
on the development of political and administrative capabilities in the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. If it is true that the EU is becoming an increasingly impor-
tant security actor, we should expect an increase in these kinds of capabilities as well. Ac-
cording to March & Olsen (1995) little can be accomplished without capabilities such as 
rights and authorities, resources, competencies and organizational skills. This should 
also be true of a presumably ‘post-modern’ actor like the EU. This paper examines the 
extent to which the EU has established these kinds of capabilities in relation to its secu-
rity policy, how they can be characterized and whether they have increased over time. 
Pernille Rieker
The EU as a Security Actor:
The development of political and administrative
capabilities

 5
1. Introduction 
This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of how the EU functions as a 
security actor, by focusing on political capacities and modes of governance. Many 
scholars have argued that the EU has developed into an international actor 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Ginsberg, 2001; Manners, 2002; Peterson and Sjursen, 
1998; Sjursen, 2006; Smith, 2002; Smith, 2003; Smith, 2004; White, 2001; Whit-
mann, 1998). This literature is characterized by a broad approach to the EU’s role in 
international politics, and typically concentrates on External Relations as well as 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). There are also a few contributions that narrow in on the extent to 
which the EU has developed into a security actor (Howorth, 2007; Rieker, 2006; 
Wæver, 2000). Whether or not the two can be said to differ depends of course on how 
broadly one defines the concept of ‘security’.  
 
There is also a large literature dealing specifically with the security- and defence-
related aspects of the CFSP and the ESDP (Deighton, 2002; Duke, 2000; Hoffmann, 
2000; Howorth, 2007; Sjursen, 2003). This is a somewhat more narrow focus, but is 
no less important. Indeed, precisely because the CFSP/ESDP is a specific policy area 
with a separate set of rules, budgets, institutions and capabilities, it is an interesting 
case to study. Surprisingly, however, nothing in the literature has concentrated on the 
development and existence of political and administrative capabilities – the adminis-
trative, budgetary and institutional capacities that the EU has at its disposal in relation 
to the CFSP and ESDP. Instead, the emphasis has typically been either on the aspira-
tions and ambitions of the EU in this area, or the development of (or the lack of) civil-
ian and military capabilities under the ESDP. This article seeks to fill that gap.  
 
That said, this paper has a more limited scope than much of the literature on EU secu-
rity policy. It does not attempt to discuss all facets of the EU’s security and defence 
policy, but is meant as a modest contribution on a topic that seems to have been ac-
corded little attention. The main argument runs thus: If the EU is to be perceived as a 
credible security actor, it also needs a certain degree of political and administrative 
capabilities. The following analysis will examine the extent to which this is the case. 
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In the next section I present the overall theoretical approach, as well as a typology of 
capabilities based on the work of March and Olsen (1995). The ensuing four sections 
examine the development of such political and administrative capacities within the 
CFSP. In the final part I sum up the main findings, and offer some conclusions on 
what this may tell us about the functioning of the EU as a security actor.  
 
2. What kind of security actor? 
2.1 A system of multi-level governance 
 
It is not immediately apparent whether the EU is an actor, and there is in European in-
tegration theory a sizeable literature that discusses precisely that question. For a long 
time the main dividing line stood between those who perceived European integration as 
solely an arena for intergovernmental bargaining (Hoffmann, 1965; Moravcsik, 1998), 
and those who saw it as a continuous process towards a supranational state (Haas, 
1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Sæter, 1998).1 Today, this debate has become 
less dominant in the integration literature, with most scholars agreeing that the EU 
should be characterized as something in-between an international organization and a 
federal state. The consequence of this compromise has been that ‘the study of the EU 
has, to a large extent, shifted from the study of integration to the study of governance 
(…) defined as being about the exercise of authority with or without the formal institu-
tions of government’ (Rosamond, 2000: 109). Rather than explaining the EU and Euro-
pean integration, their existence is taken as a fact, and the attention is shifted from 
process to polity. 
 
The EU may be characterized as a system of multi-level governance, since it is a ‘pol-
ity-creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across 
multiple levels of government – subnational, national and supranational’ (Marks and 
Hooghe, 2001: 2). According to the multi-level governance model, decision-making 
competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by na-
tional governments. This becomes particularly evident in the sphere of foreign and 
security policy – a policy area that is intergovernmental in character, but where there 
                                                 
1 For an introduction to this debate see Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European Integration (Lon-
don: Macmillan). 
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are fuzzy borders between the competencies of the Commission, the Council and the 
member states of the EU.  
 
Multi-level governance thus eradicates the traditional distinction between domestic 
and international politics. Even though most of the literature on multi-level govern-
ance takes for granted the existence of sovereign statehood, AAlberts argues that this 
perspective provides a challenging picture of the dispersal of authority. In a multi-
level governance system, she argues, the authority structures seem far more complex 
and flexible than in a conventional understanding of statehood (AAlberts, 2004: 29). 
This means that it bears a resemblance to what in IR theory has been called ‘post-
modern statehood’ or ‘neo-medievalism’. Indeed, Ruggie has claimed that the EU 
might constitute the first truly post-modern political form (Ruggie, 1998: 173). Simi-
larly, Robert Cooper has argued that the EU must be considered as the most devel-
oped post-modern system, because the dividing line between foreign and domestic 
policy is being erased, states are giving up their traditional monopoly on violence, and 
internal borders are becoming increasingly irrelevant (Cooper, 2003: 36–37).  
 
Thus, it is the special character of the EU that makes it ‘post-modern’. Its uniqueness 
is linked to institutional factors, such as the circumstance that the EU is an institu-
tional hybrid between an international organization and a federal state. In addition, the 
fact that the EU lacks a clearly defined and institutionalized security policy from the 
Cold War period is a also an important special feature. While the first opens up for 
other forms of governance than those we have become accustomed to (such as multi-
level governance), the second makes it easier to develop an innovative security ap-
proach (such as comprehensive security). In the following, I will look primarily at the 
former, focusing on governance and polity rather than on the content of policy.2  
 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of the content of policy, see Rieker Rieker, P. (2006) Europeanization of National 
Security Identity. The EU and the changing Security Identities of the Nordic States (London and New 
York: Routledge). 
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2.2 The importance of political and administrative capabilities 
 
There are various ways of understanding actorness in international politics. In both 
international law and conventional international relations, statehood has traditionally 
been seen as a requirement for being treated as an actor in the international system. 
More recently, however, other criteria have been emphasized – such as autonomy and 
the ability to perform. This makes it possible for multilateral institutions in general 
and the EU in particular to be considered as ‘actors’.  
 
Gunnar Sjöstedt defined actor capability as a ‘capacity to behave actively and deliber-
ately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt, 1977: 16). While 
he viewed this capacity primarily as a function of internal resources and internal cohe-
sion, Bretherton and Vogler have argued that actorness is constructed through the in-
terplay of both internal and external factors (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 2). They 
hold that an actor is an entity capable of formulating and acting upon decisions, but 
also that the capacity to act reflects the interaction between understandings about in-
ternal character and capabilities and external opportunities. Their focus is on interac-
tion of three types: the interaction between opportunity, in terms of the external con-
text of ideas, events and expectations – the context which shapes and frames EU ac-
tion or inaction; presence, in terms of structural power – the ability to exert influence 
externally; and internal capability – those aspects of EU policy process which con-
strain or enable external action and hence govern its ability to capitalize on presence 
or respond to opportunity. With regard to the latter, namely capability, Bretherton and 
Vogler focus on four aspects: shared commitment to a set of overarching values; do-
mestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy; the 
ability to identify priorities and formulate policies; finally, the availability of and ca-
pacity to utilize policy instruments such as diplomacy, economic tools and military 
means (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 29–35).  
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While this is an impressive and comprehensive approach, it lacks a focus on govern-
ance. This means that it does not provide an assessment of the actual political and 
administrative capabilities the EU has at its disposal and how they are used. It is im-
portant to focus on governance, because of the argument that certain basic political 
and administrative capabilities are required in order to be considered as an actor. This 
argument is based on the work of March and Olsen on democratic governance (1995). 
Even though the EU cannot be characterized as a democratic state, it is possible to 
apply some of their insights to a unity like the EU – especially as regards the devel-
opment of political capabilities. March and Olsen start that particular chapter of their 
book by arguing that ‘developing appropriate identities and acting accordance with 
them require resources and capabilities’. They further maintain that ‘the tending of 
capabilities – creating, sustaining, mobilizing, and regulating them – is the task of 
governance [and that without] such a structure of capabilities, little in the way of indi-
vidual or collective purpose can be accomplished’ (March and Olsen, 1995: 91). Ac-
cording to this understanding, it can be argued that if the EU is to be characterized as 
an actor, it needs to have certain political and administrative capabilities. This means 
that Sjöstedt’s focus on internal factors still is important. By using a typology devel-
oped by March and Olsen (1995), we may single out precisely what kinds of internal 
factors are required. 
 
2.2.1 Four types of political and administrative capabilities 
 
March and Olsen distinguish between four broad types of capabilities that are particu-
larly relevant to governance (March and Olsen, 1995: 92–95): 
 
The first type of capability that is required is what they refer to as rights and authori-
ties. Rights and authorities are capabilities enshrined in formal rules. These are pro-
tected, interpreted, and enforced by a structure of norms and institutions. By exercis-
ing valid authority and having that exercise certified by political institutions and cul-
ture, officials establish their existence as officials.  
 
Second, March and Olsen emphasize the need for resources. By resources, they mean 
the assets that make it possible to do things or to make others do things. Such assets 
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may include money, property, time, information, facilities and equipment, and have 
both individual and institutional attributes.  
 
The third type of capability is, according to March and Olsen, competencies and 
knowledge on the part of individuals, professions and institutions. Individuals have 
competencies from their education and training. Institutions encode knowledge in 
traditions and rules.  
 
Finally, March and Olsen point to the need for organizing capacity. Such capacity is 
important because it allows effective utilization of formal rights and authority, re-
sources, and competencies. ‘Without organizational talents, experience, and under-
standing, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and 
control, logistics, scheduling, allocation and mobilization of effort, division of labour 
and specialization, motivation, planning, and the mundane world of meeting dead-
lines, budgets, and collective expectations. Attention must be focused; activities must 
be meshed to produce combined effects; people must be consulted and involved; re-
sources must be conserved and expended in a timely fashion’ (March and Olsen 1995: 
95). Still, this capacity is also dependent on the availability of other capabilities and 
especially resources, competencies and knowledge. 
 
These four types of capabilities differ in the sense that some are limited resources that 
will come to an end (money, time etc.), whereas others can be said to be unlimited and 
may even increase if applied properly (competence/expertise and skills).  
 
2.2.2 Measuring and operationalization 
 
If it is true that the EU has developed into a stronger and more autonomous security 
actor, we should also expect it to have developed and strengthened the kinds of ca-
pacities presented above. Taking as our point of departure March and Olsen’s four 
types of political and administrative capabilities, let us now examine the functioning 
of the EU as a security actor.  
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If the EU is indeed a security actor, we would expect to find (1) that rights and au-
thorities have been developed for the CFSP and ESDP; (2) that resources in terms of 
budget, staff and equipment are allocated to the CFSP and ESDP; (3) that the 
CFSP/ESDP staff possess the necessary expertise and experience in this field; and (4) 
that the EU has the organizing capacity to make effective use of its formal rights, re-
sources and competencies. In addition, if it is true that the EU is becoming an increas-
ingly important security actor, we would also expect an increase in these resources 
over time. The following four sections of this article will systematically examine the 
validity of these claims.  
 
Both primary and secondary sources will be applied here. The primary sources are 
official documents as well as interviews. Regarding formal rights, I look primarily at 
the treaties that establish the rights and competencies of the various institutions in this 
policy area. When examining the resources that the EU has at its disposal in this pol-
icy area, I will look at the evolution in budgets and staffs in the period between 2002 
and 2007 as well as the development of civilian and military capacities.3 Finally I will 
discuss the expertise and knowledge the EU has in the sphere of security and defence 
as well as the level of organizational skills. While primary data can be obtained about 
the first three capabilities, the last two will be subjected to a more qualitative discus-
sion based on secondary sources and interviews with EU officials. 
 
3. An increase in formal rights and authorities 
 
How and to what extent has the EU developed a legal framework to regulate the com-
petencies of its various institutions? Here I will examine both the general legal 
framework of the CFSP that regulates the competencies of the various institutions, 
and also the rules and framework regulates the financing system, since this is impor-
tant for the ability to implement decisions (concerning joint actions in particular). The 
actual size of the budgets will be discussed in section 4.1 
 
 
                                                 
3 The time period is linked to the fact that the information about the budgets is available on-line as 
from 2002. However, this also makes sense since the ESDP was declared operational in December 
2001. 
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A multi-level legal framework for the CFSP 
While the competencies of the EU are more limited in the area of foreign and security 
policy than in other Community matters,4 there exists a legal framework that regulates 
the competencies of the CFSP institutions at the EU level, and between the EU and its 
member states. This legal framework for the CFSP is clarified under Title V in the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU), established in 1992 (Maastricht) and later re-
vised in 1999 (Amsterdam) and in 2001 (Nice). The Constitutional Treaty also pro-
posed some important new elements, several of which are included in the Reform 
Treaty that was finally agreed at the informal European Council in Lisbon on 19 Oc-
tober 2007.5  
 
The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the new office of a High Representative (HR) for 
the CFSP, fusing it with that of the Council Secretary General. The Treaty stipulates 
that the HR ‘shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy, in particular through contributing to the formula-
tion, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and 
acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting 
political dialogue with third parties’ (TEU, Title V, Article 26). But even though the 
Amsterdam Treaty indicated a relatively modest role for the HR/CFSP, the appoint-
ment of Javier Solana to this post came to shape the office in ways that have given 
him a unique stature in the diplomatic world. For many, he has become the face of the 
EU’s external relations (Duke, 2006b: 12).  
 
If the Reform Treaty is ratified, this position will become even more important, and 
will include the position as Commissioner for External Relations as well as (one of) 
the Vice Presidents of the Commission. The title will be changed to High Representa-
tive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Other relevant changes in 
the new Reform Treaty include the appointment of a permanent Council Presidency to 
chair EU summits for a two-and-a-half-year renewable term instead of a six-month 
rotation; and the introduction of a single legal personality of the EU. However, this 
                                                 
4 Community matters means “first pillar issues” or those issues that fall under the so-called European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community.   
5 Following the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 
and a two year period of reflection, the EU leaders have recently agreed on a new Reform Treaty 
(2007). 
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single legal personality will not authorize the EU to act beyond the competence con-
ferred on it by its member states, so EU declarations are still to be considered as 
statements of political intent. In any case, before the Reform Treaty can enter into 
force, it will have to be ratified by all member states.6 
 
As it stands now, the Treaty on the European Union identifies four CFSP instruments: 
general guidelines and common strategies, joint actions and common positions. Gen-
eral guidelines and Common strategies are both adopted by the European Council. 
While the former sets out priorities and broad guidelines for this policy area as a 
whole, the latter provides overall policy guidelines for activities with individual coun-
tries.7 Joint actions and common positions are somewhat more specific in scope and 
are both adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). 
While the former addresses specific situations where operational action by the EU is 
required and which therefore often translate into common administrative and opera-
tional expenditures, the latter merely defines the approach of the EU to given matters 
of a geographical or thematic nature.  
 
Formally, the various institutional actors therefore play a specific role in the decision-
making process for the various CFSP instruments. Table 1 presents the four instru-
ments and the role of the various levels or institutions. 
 
Table 1: CFSP instruments 
Instrument Who proposes? Who decides? Who implements? 
General guide-
lines 
Member states and Commis-
sion 
European 
Council 
Presidency (assisted by the HR 
CFSP) 
Common strate-
gies 
Member states and Commis-
sion 
European 
Council  
Presidency (assisted by the HR 
CFSP) 
Joint actions Member states and Commis-
sion (The Council may re-
quest the Commission to 
submit to it any appropriate 
proposals to ensure imple-
mentation) 
Council 
(GAERC) 
Commission  
(financial implementation)  
and Presidency  
(actual implementation) 
Common posi-
tions 
Member states and Commis-
sion 
Council 
(GAERC) 
Member states 
Source: The European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/fin/index.htm) 
                                                 
6 “A closer look at the Reform Treaty”, BBC News 3. August 2007 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
6928737.stm) 
7 Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by 
the EU and the member States. So far the EU has adopted Common Strategies on Russia, Ukraina, 
Mediterranean and the Middle East Process 
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Since the CFSP is an intergovernmental policy area, the legal competencies of the 
Commission are more limited compared to the policy areas under the Community. 
Still, Article 27 of the Treaty confirms that ‘the Commission shall be fully associated 
with the work carried out in the common foreign and security field’. This means that 
Commission officials are involved at every level of the CFSP, with the overall objec-
tive of ensuring consistency in the external relations of the EU as a whole, safeguard-
ing the acquis communautaire and the EC Treaties. Under Article 22 of the TEU, the 
Commission shares the right, alongside the member states, to refer to the Council any 
questions relating to the CFSP and to submit proposals. In the case of CFSP Joint Ac-
tions, for instance, the involvement of Community funding would normally give the 
Commission a role in implementation of the instrument (Duke, 2006b:8). This means 
that the Commission plays a central role in long-term conflict prevention and civilian 
crisis management. The Council and the Commission are thus jointly responsible for 
ensuring consistency in the EU’s external activities as a whole, in the context of its 
external relations, security, economic and development policies. 
 
A complex financing framework  
The multi-level governance structure of the CFSP/ESDP has led to a rather compli-
cated financing system. Some parts of the CFSP are financed by the Commission, 
some by the Council and some by ad hoc contributions from the member states and/or 
participating states (Bendiek and Whitney-Steele, 2006; Missiroli, 2006). 
 
Originally, CFSP operations were financed either from the Community budget or by 
the member states. The Maastricht  Treaty (Article J.11) specified that ‘administra-
tive’ expenditures would be charged to the EU budget, while ‘operating’ expenditures 
would either be charged to the EU budget or to the member states on a scale ‘to be 
decided’. The key problem has been how to interpret ‘operating’ as distinct from ‘ad-
ministrative’ expenditures. The fact that the EU has a growing role in the military 
sphere also adds to this complexity. Until recently, military operations were to be 
funded by contributions from the member states, following the ‘costs lie where they 
fall’ principle – meaning that costs are covered by the contributing member states and 
only them. The disadvantage of such a system is that it creates uneven burden-sharing 
(Missiroli, 2006: 50).  
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In order to make the EU a more unitary security actor, the General Affairs Council of 
17 May 2002 reached a preliminary agreement on the funding of military operations.8 
A distinction was introduced between ‘common’ costs (headquarters, infrastructure 
and medical care), and individual costs (troops, arms, equipment) to be borne by each 
member state involved. The agreement was to be revised by June 2004 in light of  
operational experience. This eventually led to the approval of the ‘ATHENA’ mecha-
nism ‘to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations having mili-
tary or defence implications’, finalized through successive revisions between Febru-
ary 2004 and January 2005. This mechanism creates an overall framework of refer-
ence as well as rules for ensuring timely down-payments from member states, thereby 
making the planning and launching of military operations much easier (Missiroli, 
2006: 50). 
There are various different ways of allocating funds to the EU’s external policy, and 
this complex funding system highlights the multi-level (or post-modern) character of 
this policy area. For civilian missions, there are at least four ways of funding. While 
the main way of financing these missions is over the CFSP budget9, some are funded 
through the European Development Fund10, the Instrument for Stability or by national 
contributions directly (this is typically the case for ad hoc missions). There are also 
two channels of financing operations that have a defence or military component. 
ESDP operations may be funded through the ATHENA mechanism or through na-
tional contributions based on the above-mentioned ‘costs lie where they fall’ princi-
ple. The ESDP agencies, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European 
Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), 
have their own budgets made up of national contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 This agreement translated into the Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council of 20 
June 2002. 
9 According to Title V Treaty on the EU, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism is also covered by the CFSP 
budget. 
10 This Fund is not in the general budget, but can be used to support civilian crisis management opera-
tions in ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries that are run by organisations working in close 
cooperation with the EU, as well as external aspects of certain community policies such as international 
fisheries agreements, encironment policy etc. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2003_v4/EN/ 
AALNT_rec.htm 
 16
An ongoing process towards more rights and authorities 
 
Given the multi-level and post-modern character of the CFSP/ESDP, the legal and 
financial framework for this policy area is characterized by complexity. In addition, it 
is under constant revision. Still, since establishment in 1992, the CFSP and ESDP can 
be said to have gradually gained increased rights and authorities. And as noted, with 
the recently adopted Reform Treaty, the EU may even get a legal personality. 
 
4. Limited but increasing resources  
 
This section will examine the extent to which the EU has resources – budget, staff and 
equipment – in the sphere of common foreign and security policy. In focus here are 
the size and the composition of the budget, the number of staff working in the Com-
mission and in the Council, as well as the military and the civilian capabilities avail-
able to the EU. 
 
4.1 A small but growing CFSP Budget 
Funds available for the CFSP are covered in a special chapter (ch.3) under the ‘Exter-
nal Relations’ title of the general budget (title 19). Commonly known as the ‘CFSP 
budget’, this chapter of the Community budget is subject to the regulations that apply 
to the general budget and therefore follows standard budgetary rules. It is determined 
on an annual basis by the Council and the European Parliament acting on proposals 
made by the Commission. In this section I will present the numbers of the budget 
from 2002 until 2008 as well as the prospects for the future (until 2013). 
 
 
The CFSP budget from 2002 to 2008 
As Figure 1 indicates, there has been a significant increase in the CFSP budget in the 
period from 2002 to 2008. While the budget for 2002 amounts to €30 million, the pre-
liminary draft budget for 2008 was close to €200 million.  While this increase is im-
portant, it should also be seen in relation to the enlargement of the EU, from 15 to 27 
member states, that has taken place in this period.  
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Figure 1: Total annual budget for the CFSP (2002–2008), in million Euros. 
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Still, the CFSP budget represents only a relatively small part of the External Relations 
budget. As we see from Table 2 below, it has varied between 0.4% in 2002 and 5.4% 
in 2008. It is important to note, however, that the budgets for 2002 and 2003 operate 
with figures for ‘External Action’, which covers far more than the ‘External Rela-
tions’ title in the budgets as from 2004. In fact, the 2002 and 2003 budgets include the 
pre-accession strategy for candidate countries, the European development fund, hu-
manitarian and food aid, in addition to other aspects of External Relations. This ex-
plain why the size of the budgets for 2002 and 2003 is more than the double that of 
the following years. 
 
Table 2: External Relations and the CFSP budget, in million Euros 
 External Action/ 
External Rela-
tions 
CFSP  CFSP in % of 
External Rela-
tions 
2002 8466.2   30 0.4 
2003 8469.4    47.5 0.6 
2004 3525.7   62.6  1.8 
2005 3562.1   62.2  1.8 
2006 3469.8 102.4  3 
2007 3378 159.2 4.7 
2008 3709 199.9 5.4 
 
This does not influence the increase in the CFSP budget, however, and, as can be seen 
from Table 2, it is particularly important as from 2005. A closer look at the subsec-
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tions of the budgets reveals that it was especially the conflict resolution section that 
stood for the increase from 2005 to 2006, in addition to non-proliferation and disar-
mament. In 2007, a new budget line for police mission was introduced, which stood 
for 35% of the CFSP budget. For 2008 this is expected to represent 30% of the CFSP 
budget. The EU has undertaken police missions before 2007, but these have been 
funded under some of the other budget lines for crisis management and conflict reso-
lution.  
 
While our focus here is primarily on the CFSP and the ESDP, it is important to note 
that the role of the Commission in civilian crisis management and conflict prevention 
sometimes goes beyond the CFSP/ESDP. Thus, in order to cover all the activities of 
the EU in this policy area, we should include a larger part of the External Relations 
budget and in some cases even smaller parts of the budget for the Directorate General 
(DG) of Humanitarian Aid and Development, EuropAid and ECHO. This is particu-
larly true as from 2007. Since the 2007 budget is part of the new financial framework, 
it has, in addition to the CFSP chapter, some new chapters of particular relevance for 
this policy area. Despite these changes, the evolution in the CFSP budget can still give 
a good indication of most activities linked to civilian crisis management and conflict 
prevention. 
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Figure 2: The CFSP budget from 2002–2008 
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As we see from Figure 2, there is no specific budget line for civilian crisis manage-
ment in the CFSP budget. According to the head of unit for the CFSP and Rapid Re-
action Mechanism (RRM) in the Directorate A (DG Relex), however, civilian crisis 
management is still the largest single field, consuming roughly three-quarters of the 
CFSP budget.11 This means that it must be an important part of most budget lines.12 
One of the new chapters under the External Relations title in the 2007 budget is ‘Cri-
sis response and global threats to security’ (ch. 6). This chapter includes the new In-
strument for Stability – a financial instrument that replaces the old Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism and makes it possible for the Commission to respond quickly to the needs 
of countries threatened with or undergoing severe political instability. The total 
                                                 
11 Interview per e-mail in July 2007.  
12 The following civilian ESDP operations were/are financed under the Community budget line: 
EUPM (EU police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina), Proxima (EU police mission in Macedonia), 
EUPAT (EU police advisory team in Macedonia), EUPOL Kinshasa (EU police mission in Congo), 
EUJUST Lex (EU rule of law mission in Iraq), EUJUST Themis (EU rule of law mission in Georgia), 
EUSEC Congo (EU security sector reform mission in Congo), AMISII (EU support to Amis II in Dar-
four), AMM (EU Monitoring mission in Aceh), EUPOL COPPS (EU police mission for the Palestinian 
Territories), EU MAM Rafah (EU border Assistance mission for the Rafah crossing point), EUPOL 
Afghanistan /EU police mission to Afghanistan.  
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budget for this chapter was €198.8 million for 2007 and 249.6 million for 2008. In 
2007, € 100 million was earmarked for the Instrument for Stability.13 
 
Prospects for the future 
The new financial framework for the period 2007–2013 was adopted in May 2003 by 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the form of an ‘Interin-
stitutional Agreement (IIA) on budgetary discipline and sound financial manage-
ment’. One of the main priorities of this agreement was ‘to establish a coherent role 
for the EU as a global player’.  
In the new financial perspective, the old ‘External Action’ heading has been re-
labelled ‘The EU as a global player’. Its overall endowment amounts to approximately 
€ 50 billion over seven years, which is 5% of the overall EU budget and represents an 
average annual increase of 29% (Bendiek and Whitney-Steele, 2006: 1).  
 ‘The EU as a global player’ covers such diverse activities as pre-accession funding 
(€10.2 million), neighbourhood and partnership relations (10.6 million) and develop-
ment cooperation and economic cooperation instrument (15.1 million), the instrument 
for stability (€2.5 million); the CFSP (€1.7 million); and emergency aid reserve and 
other ad hoc envelopes like humanitarian aid (€8.1 million). The CFSP chapter is ex-
pected to cover crisis management operations (civilian only); conflict prevention, 
resolution and stabilization; monitoring and implementation of peace and security 
processes; non-proliferation and disarmament; emergency measures; preparatory and 
follow-up measures; and EU Special Representatives (Bendiek and Whitney-Steele, 
2006: 7).  
Thus, there are other parts of the budget than the CFSP chapter that are of relevance to 
civilian crisis management and conflict prevention – the Instrument for Stability not 
least. However, the CFSP budget still gives a good indication of the prospects for this 
particular policy area. Here we can note that the CFSP budget is expected to increase 
from €150 million in 2007 to 340 million by 2013 (see Figure 3).  
                                                 
13 Information from the European Commission: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/ COL22007_ 
VOL4/EN/nmc-titleN188CA/nmc-chapterN60591451817-26/index.html#N60591451817-26 
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Figure 3: CFSP budget (2007–2013) 
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Source: Bendiek, 2006: 7 
 
The funding of military operations 
As mentioned, military operations are funded by the EU member states through the 
ATHENA mechanism and national contributions. The national contributions of the 
member states to the ATHENA financing mechanism for military operations are de-
termined according to a GNP scale.14 The ATHENA mechanism has a permanent 
structure and legal capacity.15 From 2005 to 2006 its budget increased from €60 to 
€68 million, but was reduced to 35 million in 2007 due to the termination of the mili-
tary operation in DR Congo in 2006.  
Here it should be noted that the ATHENA mechanism provides funding for common 
costs only – and these represent less than 10% of the total cost of EU military opera-
tions. This means that more than 90% of costs continue to be covered by the states 
participating in a given operation.16  
This system makes it highly unlikely that the EU can implement a significant opera-
tion without the participation of one or several of its bigger members. This means that 
those member states whose armed forces have the necessary capabilities, in particular 
strategic airlift and rapid-reaction capabilities, still carry the heaviest financial burden. 
                                                 
14 The only country that does not participate is Denmark. Third countries may participate as well 
15 This means that it may hold a bank account, acquire, hold or dispose of property, enter into con-
tracts and administrative arrangements and be a party to legal proceedings. It is managed under the 
authority of a Special Committee and manages the common costs. 
16 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june-2007.pdf 
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Until now it is France that has been the major contributing country in terms of per-
sonnel and equipment to EU military operations (Haugevik, 2006: 13). 
ATHENA currently administers the financing of the common costs of EUFOR-Althea 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina) with €33 million in 2007 and AMIS (Sudan/Darfur) with 
1.3 million in 2007. In 2006 ATHENA administered the financing of the common 
costs of EUFOR in DR Congo to the tune of €23 million (EU Council Secretariat Fact 
Sheet, June 2007). In 2005 it was responsible for the financing of specific common 
costs during the first two months of a civilian project in Congo (EUSEC-RD Congo) 
until the mission could be accommodated under the CFSP budget (€0.9 million).17  
Limited, but increasing budgets  
Even though the EU budget for the CFSP is limited compared to other policy areas, 
there has been a considerable increase in the period from 2002 to 2008, and according 
to the new financial framework this increase will continue until 2013. Thus, in terms 
of budget, the EU has become a more important actor in the area of civilian crisis 
management, and this becomes even more pronounced if we include other parts of the 
External Relations budget that are of relevance for civilian crisis management.  
 
Regarding military operations, the picture is somewhat different, since funding here 
depends largely on national contributions. The establishment of the ATHENA mecha-
nism is important for providing the EU with the necessary means to cover the com-
mon costs related to a military mission – but, as noted, these represent only 10% of 
the total cost of a military operation; moreover, there are no emergency funds for 
tackling unforeseen crises. Funding for military operations can be made available only 
on the basis of a joint action establishing an operation, and there is, for instance, no 
provision for covering the crucial stage of preliminary fact-finding. Lengthy procure-
ment procedures also undermine the rapid deployment of ESDP operations. 
 
                                                 
17 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june-2007.pdf 
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4.2 Many institutions and few people 
 
The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring the consistency 
of EU external activities as a whole. These activities cover all aspects of external rela-
tions, security, economic and developments policies. In this section, we will take a 
closer look at the institutions and staffs working with security-related issues in the 
Commission and the Council as well as agencies such as the EDA, EUISS and EUSC. 
 
Commission 
 
The Commission implements its external action through five Directorates General: the 
DG for External Relations (DG Relex), DG for Trade, DG for Enlargement, DG for 
Development and DG for Humanitarian Aid. The Commissioners for these DGs con-
stitute the Group of Commissioners for External Relations, which is chaired by the 
President of the Commission. While the DG for External Relations is subdivided into 
12 directorates and has a staff of 661 people out of 23,608 (in 2007)18, the staff in 
Directorate A19 (dealing with CFSP and ESDP-related issues) numbers only about 60. 
This means that while only 3% of the staff in the Commission as a whole is working 
in DG Relex, 9% of the staff within DG Relex is working with issues related to the 
CFSP and ESDP.  
 
As noted, the Commission’s role in civilian crisis management cannot be reduced to 
these activities alone. As Gourlay argues, ‘although the term civilian crisis manage-
ment was first used in the context of the development of the non-military capacities to 
be used in the framework of ESDP, the Community has long engaged in a range of 
                                                 
18 The largest DG being the DG for translation and the DG for research who has a staff of 2,222 and 
1,173 respectively. Source: Statistical Bulletin of Commission staff  (October 2007) http://ec.europa. 
eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm 
19 Directorate A is dealing with CFSP and ESDP-related issues, the European Correspondent’s office, 
Commission coordination and contribution, as well as the Community aspects of CFSP Joint Actions, 
sanctions, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, disarmament, conflict prevention, Community contribu-
tions to crisis management and any CFSP/ESDP aspects stemming from relations with the seventy 
eight African, Pacific and Caribbean countries. It also follows any CFSP aspects of the efforts to stem 
the flow of “conflict” diamonds (the Kimberly process) and any relevant matters arising in the G8 con-
text (Duke 2006: 12). The others are; Directorate CP (Principal Advisor), Directorate B (Multilateral 
relations and human rights); Directorate C (North America, East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, EEA, 
EFTA, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco; Directorate D (European Neighbourhood Policy); Director-
ate E (Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus, Central Asian Republics); Directorate F (Middle East, 
South Mediterranean); Directorate G (Latin America); Directorate H (Asia); Directorate I (Headquar-
ters resources, Information, Interinstitutional relations); Directorate K (External service); Directorate L 
(Strategy, Coordination and analysis). (http://europa.eu/whoiswho/public/index.cfm?fuseaction= idea. 
hierarchy&nodeID=994)  
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activities that provide assistance to third countries in crisis’ (Gourlay, 2006b: 49). 
Since these efforts go beyond the CFSP and ESDP, it makes sense to add to our calcu-
lations some of the staff working in the DG for Humanitarian Aid and Development 
(263), the EuropAid Cooperation Office (589) and the European Community Humani-
tarian Office (ECHO) (158).20 But even if we assume that all of them contribute to 
this policy area, that still means that only about 6% of the total staff of the Commis-
sion are involved in work with civilian crisis management and conflict prevention.  
 
Council 
 
The Council is made up of the ministers of the member states and meets in nine dif-
ferent configurations, depending on the matters under discussion. The General Affairs 
Council21 is one of the oldest configurations of the Council. Since June 2002 it has 
held separate meetings on General Affairs and External Relations. The latter meet 
once a month and deal with the whole of the EU's external action, including Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy, foreign trade and 
development cooperation. A priority in recent years for the Council, in cooperation 
with the Commission, has been to ensure coherence in the EU’s external action across 
the range of instruments at the EU’s disposal. These meetings bring together the 
member states’ foreign ministers; ministers responsible for European affairs, defence, 
development or trade also participate, depending on the items on agenda. Their dis-
cussions are prepared by the Council Secretariat and its committees and working 
groups.  
 
The Council Secretariat assists the Council and the Presidency. It plays a particularly 
important role in relations to the CFSP and ESDP through the High Representative for 
the CFSP (HR/CFSP), the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (the Policy Unit) 
as well as the Military Staff. The total number of staff working with the CFSP and 
ESDP at the General Secretariat of the European Union is 32222 out of a total of 
                                                 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm 
21 At its sessions on General Affairs, the Council deals with dossiers that affect more than one of the 
Union's policies, such as negotiations on EU enlargement, preparation of the Union's multi–annual 
budgetary perspective or institutional and administrative issues. It co–ordinates preparation for and 
follow-up to meetings of the European Council. It also exercises a role in co–ordinating work on dif-
ferent policy areas carried out by the Council's other configurations, and handles any dossier entrusted 
to it by the European Council. 
22 Information by e-mail from the General Secretariat of the Council – “information to the public”. 
 25
3,46123 (in 2007). Of the total staff, 200 are employed at the EU military staff, 94 in 
the CFSP and ESDP policy units at the DG for External Relations and 28 at the 
HR/CFSP’s private office.24  This means that 9.5% of the total staff in the Council is 
working with CFSP- and ESDP-related issues. 
 
As shown in Fig. 4, there has been an increase in the number of personnel working in 
the CFSP/ESDP policy units in the Council from 2002 and 2007, especially since 
2005. 
 
Figure 4: Council staff working with foreign and security policy (2002–2007):25 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total Councila 
 2,866 2,640 3,140 3,234 3,393 3,461 
CFSP/ESDP 
policy unitsb 41 43 45 62 76 94 
a Figures from the annual budget, available  on line26 
b Figures provided by the Council’s information service 
 
Despite the increase in personnel working with the CFSP and ESDP in the Council, 
human resources are still limited compared to the total number of staff. As the Direc-
tor General for External and Politico-Military Affairs in the Council, Robert Cooper, 
has remarked: ‘[the ]Brussels staff of 200 effectively do ESDP, whereas there appear 
to be many thousands of academics and students all over the world who engage in the 
study of the subject’ (quoted in Howorth, 2007: 4).27 
 
The agencies 
In addition to the staff working in the Commission and the Council, we must add the 
people working in agencies such as the European Defence Agency (EDA), the Euro-
pean Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC). The 
EDA was established in 2004 in order to support the member states and the Council in 
their efforts to improve European defence capabilities in crisis management. The 
other two were originally part of the Western European Union, but were integrated 
into the EU in 2001 and 2002, respectively. The EUISS  provides research and policy 
                                                 
23 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/budget/data/D2006_VOL1/EN/nmc-grseqAP2000182/index.html 
24 Information by e-mail from the General Secretariat of the Council – “information to the public”. 
25 The numbers do not include the Military Staff. 
26 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/www/index-en.htm 
27 Since the total number of staff working with CFSP and ESDP is somewhat higher, he probably 
refers to the military staff only. 
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analysis on the CFSP and ESDP, while the EUSC supports the EU’s decision-making 
in the sphere of the CFSP and ESDP by providing products from the analysis of satel-
lite imagery and collateral data, including aerial imagery and related services. 
 
Many institutions, few people 
The growth of the CFSP has led to the development of new and significant institutions 
under the Council. The creation of the post of High Representative for the CFSP, the 
Situation Centre and the Policy Unit, followed soon after by Special Representatives 
and Personal Representatives, alongside early steps towards an ESDP, might appear to 
indicate that the Commission’s role has been reduced to merely the administrative and 
practical aspects of running sizeable aid and assistance programmes and negotiating 
framework and association agreements with neighbours. However, the influence of 
the budget means that the Commission still is in a position to play an important role in 
those aspects of the CFSP that deal with civilian crisis management (Duke, 2006b: 
17).  But even if we include all the staff working with security-relevant issues in the 
Commission (somewhere between 3 and 6%), the Council (9,5%) as well as the agen-
cies, the overall conclusion is that there are many institutions but relatively few peo-
ple dealing with this policy area at the EU level. 
 
4.3 Still a civilian power?  
 
In addition to budget and staff, it is also important to have the necessary equipment in 
order to be able to implement policy. March and Olsen use the example of the gov-
ernance of hospitals and libraries, arguing that ‘hospitals without bandages cannot 
function as proper hospitals [and] libraries without books cannot function as proper 
libraries’ (March and Olsen, 1995: 93). Likewise, a security actor cannot function 
properly without civilian and military capabilities. 
 
Much has happened in this area since the beginning of the decade. Headline Goals 
have been identified and capability commitment conferences have been organized. 
The former has established some specific objectives and the latter have forced the 
member states to identify civilian and military capabilities that can be made available 
for future EU operations. The European Council at Laeken 14–15 December 2001 
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adopted a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP, officially recognizing 
that the EU is now capable of conducting at least some crisis management operations. 
The first ESDP operations were launched in 2003; currently there are eleven ongoing 
ESDP operations (nine civilian and two military). In addition, eight operations – six 
civilian, two military – undertaken by the EU have now come to an end.28 This indi-
cates that the EU still is primarily a civilian actor. Still, the EU has ambitions in the 
military field and there has been an important progress over the past ten years. 
 
Military capabilities 
At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Rapid Response was identified as an impor-
tant aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 
assigned to member states the objective of being able to provide rapid response ele-
ments available and deployable at very high levels of readiness. It called for EU 
member states to be able to deploy up to 60,000 personnel within 60 days, to be sus-
tainable for one year, in support of the Petersberg tasks.29 The Helsinki Headline Goal 
was to be met by December 2003, and several capability commitment conferences 
were organized in order to identify EU member states contributions. Even though this 
goal has not been stressed later in the process, the ESDP was declared operational at 
the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001. However, this only 
meant that the EU was capable of conducting some crisis management operations. The 
first operations were launched in 2003 (Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in the 
PR Congo), and today the EU is engaged in a stability operation in Bosnia (Althea) 
and a support operation in Darfur (Amis II).  
 
June 2003 saw the launch of the first EU autonomous military crisis management op-
eration, Operation Artemis in the PR Congo. It showed very successfully the EU's 
ability to operate with a rather small force at a distance of more than 6,000 km from 
Brussels. Moreover, it demonstrated the need for further development of rapid re-
sponse capabilities. Subsequently, ‘Artemis’ became a reference model for the devel-
opment of a new Headline Goal. With the adoption of the European Security Strategy 
in December 2003, the EU member states determined to set themselves a new goal 
                                                 
28 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g 
29 Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (referred to as “peace enforcement” in some con-
texts). 
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reflecting the evolution of the strategic environment and technology. In May 2004, 
EU defence ministers adopted the Headline Goal 2010, later (in June) endorsed by the 
European Council. The new headline goal calls on EU member states ‘to be able by 
2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to 
the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the 
European Union’ (quoted Lindström, 2007: 3). Among the milestones identified in the 
2010 horizon were establishing a civil–military cell within the EU Military Staff, es-
tablishing a European Defence Agency (EDA) and completing the development of the 
rapid-deployment EU battle groups,30 including the identification of appropriate stra-
tegic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets. This Headline Goal focused on devel-
oping qualitative rather than quantitative capabilities, emphasizing rapid-deployment, 
interoperable forces that can be sustained as needed through rotations.31 Since January 
2007 the EU also has its own independent operations centre within the Military Staff, 
which enables the EU to command missions and operations of a limited size from 
Brussels.32 
 
Originally, the ambition was to have a total of thirteen battle groups at the disposal of 
the EU at any given time. However, in reality, the EU’s ambition for the battle group 
concept has been confined to being able to have two such groups on standby, capable 
of carrying out two missions concurrently. Usually, force generation for the battle 
groups will mean assigning units from national contingents and placing them at the 
disposal of the EU. Sometimes it will simply mean placing such contingents on a 
higher level of readiness. One notable exception is the Nordic battle group, whose 
Swedish core unit has been specifically built up for this purpose. In many respects, the 
battle group concept places main responsibility for the generation and deployment of 
a battle group firmly on the member states. Neither the EU military staff nor the EDA 
will play a central role during implementation of the concept. This places a heavy 
burden upon the framework nation responsible for the readiness of the battle group as 
                                                 
30 The ambition was to establish at least 13 battlegroups of 15000 troops each, capable of being de-
ployed in 15 days for a period of 30 days. A battle group may be established by one state or of a lead 
nation with contributions from other states or as a multinational force. 
31 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups_February_07-factsheet.pdf 
32 The EU has now three options for commanding ESDP operations: 1. Make use of one of the five 
Operation Headquarters currently available in the EU member states. 2. Make use of SHAPE command 
and control options (under the “Berlin plus” agreement between EU and NATO). 3. Make use of the 
Union’s own operation centre within the Military Staff.  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/ 
showPage.asp?id=1211&lang=EN&mode=g 
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well as the command and control arrangements, the strategic lift and the strategic re-
serve that must be on call, ready to respond if unexpected problems should necessitate 
reinforcements (Mölling, 2006). 
 
In May 2006, the EU published its sixth semestrial Capability Improvement Chart, 
listing progress towards meeting qualitative readiness targets. It was argued that the 
EU was now beginning to look like an increasingly credible potential military actor. 
According to Ståle Ulriksen (2007), however, the ongoing military integration in 
Europe is better understood as a decentralized process in the sense that it is not guided 
by a single political or military plan, or organized within a single institutional frame-
work. In his view, today’s situation is characterized by a complex, rather decentral-
ized network of multinational cooperative projects, with the number of participants in 
each project varying from two to more than ten (Ulriksen, 2007). This means that it is 
difficult to get a full assessment of the civilian and military capabilities of the EU 
without taking into account all the civilian and military capabilities of its individual 
member states. And since the EU’s own estimates of progress fail to take this into 
account, they often give the wrong impression. As Ulriksen argues, ‘the Capabilities 
Improvement Chart I/2006, for instance, shows no progress in carrier based air power, 
helicopter carriers or strategic Sealift since 2002. However, the fact is that Italy has 
built a new aircraft carrier/amphibious ship, France has built two helicopter carri-
ers/command ships, and Britain has built two large assault ships and introduced a 
class of four large amphibious vessels. These ships also represent a large increase in 
strategic sealift capabilities for the EU’ (Ulriksen, 2007: xx). But despite the progress 
made by some member states in relation to strategic lift capacity, important shortcom-
ings still remain in connection with pre-determined headquarters for military opera-
tions, extraction forces, common training and interoperability (Howorth 2007: 112–
115). 
 
Civilian capabilities 
At the June 2000 European Council in Feira, Portugal, EU leaders launched the civil-
ian dimension of the ESDP. They established four priority fields of civilian action: 
police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration, and civil 
protection. They also undertook to provide, by 2003, up to 5,000 police officers for 
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international missions. EU member states further agreed to identify and be able to 
deploy up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days when needed.  
 
Specific targets in the rule of law (up to 200 experts), civilian administration and ci-
vilian protection (i.a., civil protection intervention teams consisting of up to 2,000 
persons) were identified at the European Council held in Gothenburg, Sweden, in 
June 2001 (Lindström, 2007). At the Brussels European Council in June 2004, two 
additional priority areas were added: monitoring and support to EU Special Represen-
tatives. In addition, a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was adopted, aimed at developing 
civilian ESDP capabilities deployable within 30 days. A Civilian Capability Com-
mitment Conference was held in November 2004 to identify EU member-state contri-
butions. The Conference confirmed that states had volunteered 5,761 police person-
nel, 621 rule-of-law experts, 562 civilian administration experts and 4,988 individuals 
for civil protection. In June 2005, modalities were outlined ‘for setting up and deploy-
ing multi-functional civilian crisis management resources in an integrated format in-
cluding deployable Civilian Response Teams’ (quoted in Lindström, 2007: 6). Civil-
ian Response Teams (CRT) are to have expertise in border policing, administration of 
justice, management of public administration services, civil protection, logistics 
and/or operations support. It is envisaged that, as a rapid-response tool, a CRT could 
be mobilized and deployed within five days of a request from the HR CFSP, the PSC 
or the Council. Achieving a CRT capacity of approximately 100 experts with CRT 
induction training was completed in December 2006 (Lindström, 2007).  
 
In addition there are the instruments of the Commissions. Although the Council began 
to establish civilian crisis management capabilities in 2000, some crisis management 
capability already existed in the Commission. Some of these – like the new instrument 
for stability – were mentioned above, in relation to the discussion about the budget, 
but it is important to note that the Commission has long been active through its exter-
nal assistance programmes in all phases of a crisis cycle (preventive strategies through 
mainstream assistance programme including institution-building and post-crisis reha-
bilitation and reconstruction), and that these programmes must be seen as an impor-
tant part of the EU’s efforts in civilian crisis management. In order to deliver its assis-
tance in a strategic timely and accountable way, the Commission has developed a 
range of geographic and specialized sectoral financial instruments (Gourlay, 2006b: 
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50). There is also political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as a main objec-
tive of the EU’s external relations (European Council, 2001). 
 
A civilian power with military ambitions 
Since 2000, the EU has developed and improved both its military and civilian capa-
bilities for crisis management. While important progress has been made in military 
crisis management, the EU remains primarily a civilian crisis management actor. Here 
it has initiated many activities – especially if we count those undertaken by the Com-
mission. Moreover, the EU has undertaken/is currently undertaking as many as fifteen 
civilian ESDP operations, as against only four military operations. Still, it is evident 
that the EU has ambitions of becoming a more important military actor. 
 
4.4 Limited, but increasing resources 
 
Regarding the second capability, the overall conclusion is that the EU has limited but 
increasing resources in this policy area. It also seems valid to say that the EU has re-
mained primarily a civilian crisis management actor.  
 
The budgets are relatively limited compared to other policy areas in the EU, and it 
also lacks emergency funds to act efficiently in relation to possible crisis that might 
arise. On the other hand, the CFSP budget has grown considerably since 2002, and the 
financial framework for the period 2007–2013 stipulates a further important increase. 
Moreover, civilian crisis management is the largest single field, consuming roughly 
75% of the CFSP budget. To this we may add other parts of the external relations 
budget, such as the Instrument for Stability, and in some cases also parts of the budget 
for development and humanitarian aid. Even though military operations are not 
funded over the Community budget, the Council has established a financing mecha-
nism that administers the financing of the common costs (like headquarters and infra-
structure) of EU military crisis management operations, and this has made the plan-
ning and launching of military operations easier. On the other hand,  since such com-
mon costs represent less than 10% of the total cost of EU military operations, the EU 
is still highly dependent on the participation of one or several of its bigger member 
states. 
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While the budgets are increasing, the number of staff in this policy area is decreasing, 
at least in some institutions. The Commission must be said to have a rather limited 
staff in relation to the CFSP, even if we include the staff that work with security-
related issues in other parts of the Commission (approx. 6%). The number of staff 
working with the CFSP in the Commission was halved in 2002, but has remained 
fairly stable since 2003. The picture is a bit different with the General Secretariat in 
the Council. Here the number of staff working with the CFSP and ESDP is also lim-
ited (about 10%), but in some units this has increased considerably since 2002. 
 
With regard to equipment or military and civilian capabilities, several headline goals 
have been identified and also to some extent achieved. However, as noted above, 
shortcomings remain in connection with pre-determined headquarters for military 
operations, extraction forces, common training and interoperability. Until now the EU 
has undertaken only four military operations, as against a total of 15 civilian opera-
tions of various kinds. This indicates that the EU still is much more of a civilian crisis 
management actor even though it has the ambition and the potential to play an impor-
tant role in military crisis management as well. 
 
5. An ongoing learning process  
 
Here we will examine the extent to which the EU has the necessary competencies and 
knowledge in the area of foreign and security policy. It is often argued that the EU is a 
young and inexperienced security actor (Hoffmann 2000; Kagan 2003). But even 
though the EU did not start developing a security policy until the end of the Cold War, 
it has proven surprisingly adaptive to the new security context. Moreover, its various 
member states have lengthy experience, both from their individual security policies 
and through participation in other multilateral frameworks such as NATO and the UN. 
Some of this expertise is also channelled through national participation in various 
expert groups (under the Commission) and working groups (under the Council). 
  
Towards a comprehensive security approach 
One reason why the EU can be characterized as a post-modern security actor is be-
cause it lacks a clearly defined security policy legacy from the past. Not having an 
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established, institutionalized and specific policy approach has made it easier to adapt 
to the new security context and to develop a comprehensive security approach 
(Rieker, 2006: ch.2). While the absence of a security policy legacy may be understood 
as resulting from a certain reluctance on the part of member states to relinquish na-
tional sovereignty in the traditional security area, it is precisely this reluctance that 
seems to have facilitated the post-modern security approach – an approach that 
stresses the value of combining different security policy tools. Ever since the early 
1990s, it is a comprehensive approach to security that the EU has emphasized in offi-
cial documents and speeches. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has also started to trans-
form the ideas inherent in this discourse into concrete policy. However, in relation to 
the implementation phase, some important shortcomings remain (see section 6).  
 
While the CFSP has had a broad approach from the outset, the development has been 
more gradual in relation to the security and defence policy. In the Maastricht Treaty, 
the long-term goal was still the development of a ‘common defence’. Then, with the 
incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty, the focus shifted to-
wards developing a capacity for ‘international crisis management’. Then came the 
establishment of a civilian crisis management component in parallel to the military 
one as from 2000, and the focus on comprehensive security in the European Security 
Strategy in 2003 (Rieker, 2006: 46–47). 
 
Learning from the member states 
It can also be said that the EU actively draws on the competence available in its mem-
ber states. One concrete example is the Commission’s use of ‘expert groups’, com-
posed of members from national governments, academia and various interest groups. 
The main task of such groups is ‘to advise the Commission in the preparation of legis-
lative proposals and policy initiatives as well as in its tasks of monitoring and coordi-
nation or cooperation with the member states. Expert groups do not formally make 
political decisions, but feed the decision-making processes by giving expert advice, 
providing scientific knowledge, sharing practical experience and information and well 
as being forums for exchange of information. The groups can be either permanent or 
temporary’(Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 6).  
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According to Gornitzska and Sverdrup (2007), these expert groups have become in-
creasingly important in the EU. Since the role of expert groups is so central in the 
European multi-level governance system, it would appear relevant to examine the use 
of such groups in the sphere of External Relations and the CFSP. Oddly enough, there 
are very few expert groups in this policy area. While there were 1,237 expert groups 
organized by the European Commission as a whole as of January 2007, less than 5% 
of these relate to external relations policies (Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 14). 
Moreover, since – as Gornitzska and Sverdrup show –the overall trend is for expert 
groups to increase over time, it seems particularly remarkable that the use of such 
groups in the sphere of External Relations has decreased considerably since 2000. 
While DG Relex had 35 expert groups in 2000, there were only 11 by 2007 
(Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 16). Of the current expert groups, only two are 
linked directly to the CFSP/ESDP (the group on ‘longer-term measures of the Instru-
ment for Stability’ and on ‘conflict prevention and crisis management’). The others 
are linked to cooperation agreements with various regions and countries around the 
world.33 There are only four DGs that have reduced the number of expert groups in 
this period – and three of these are External Relations DGs. In addition to DG Relex, 
this is also the case for EuropeAid Cooperation Office (Aidco), the DG for Enlarge-
ment, and finally, the DG for Information Society and Media (Infso) (Gornitzska and 
Sverdrup, 2007: 16: 22). 
 
While the Commission’s use of expert groups varies according to the policy area in 
question, all the work of the Council is prepared or coordinated by the Permanent 
Representatives Committee (COREPER), made up of the permanent representatives 
of the member states working in Brussels and their assistants. The work of this Com-
mittee is itself prepared by some 250 committees and working groups consisting of 
delegates from the member states.34 Also here there are good opportunities to draw on 
the knowledge and experience of member states. Concerning the CFSP, the work is 
prepared in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This committee is composed 
of 27 permanent representatives with the rank of ambassadors, and meets twice or 
three times a week in Brussels. Since 2002 there has been a division of labour be-
tween COREPER and the PSC, in that the former prepares the Council meetings on 
                                                 
33 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/search.cfm?l=all 
34 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=388&lang=en 
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General Affairs and the latter prepares the Council meetings on External Affairs and 
Security Policy. In turn, the PSC gets advice and recommendations from the Military 
Committee, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, and from 
various other CFSP working groups, depending on the issue. While the Military 
Committee is composed of Chiefs of the Defence Staff of the member states and 
meets only twice a year, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is 
a working group at expert level (or the permanent representatives in Brussels), and 
normally meets twice a week. All in all, there are 36 permanent CFSP Council work-
ing groups that have been set up following thematic or geographical lines. Meeting 
frequency may vary, but on average a CFSP working group meets twice a week at the 
level of permanent representatives and twice per Presidency at the level of senior offi-
cials from the foreign ministries of member states (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006: 5).  
 
Education and exercises at the EU  level 
The EU has also taken several initiatives in order to upgrade its own expertise in secu-
rity and defence. In 2005, for instance, the Council adopted a joint action which led to 
the establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), organized 
as a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within 
the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues. ‘The ESDC provides training 
in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the strategic level 
in order to develop and promote a common understanding of ESDP among civilian 
and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, 
best practice in relation to various ESDP issues.’35 There are also two training pro-
grammes that deal with Civil Military Coordination – one that has been run by the 
Commission since 2001 and one led by the Council since 2004. Both have been di-
rected towards diplomatic, civilian and military personnel from the member states 
(Khol, 2006: 132). Finally, the EU has undertaken four crisis management and mili-
tary exercises – CME 02, CME/CMX 03, CME 04 and MILEX 07.36 At the EU mili-
tary exercise in June 2007, Javier Solana emphasized the importance of this learning 
process, and stated: ‘we will continue to test and learn each year […]. we will also 
                                                 
35 http://www.ihedn.fr/cesd/index_en.php 
36 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=283&lang=en&mode=g 
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continue to strengthen our capacity by learning from the actual operations we are run-
ning.’37  
 
An ongoing learning process 
As we have seen, the EU has gained a certain degree of competence and knowledge in 
this area. It has even developed its own approach to security, which may be termed 
comprehensive security. The EU also actively draws on the expertise found in its 
member states through various expert and working groups. The establishment of insti-
tutions and practices like the European Defence College and civilian and military ex-
ercises also serve to increase the Union’s expertise in this sphere. On the other hand, 
the use of expert groups in the field of the CFSP has decreased considerably since 
2000 – and this is striking, since the trend is exactly the opposite in other policy areas, 
and the Commission’s role in civilian crisis management is increasing. One explana-
tion might be that few countries have more experience than the Commission in the 
sphere of comprehensive security and civilian crisis management, so that in this par-
ticular area it is the member states that learn from the EU (Rieker, 2006). 
 
6. Lack of Organizational Skills 
Perhaps the main challenge for the EU is to find a way to overcome some institutional 
challenges. As we have seen, there are many levels and institutions that have a role to 
play in this particular policy area.  
 
With no less than four DGs responsible for external relations and development, there 
is a coordination challenge for external relations within the Commission itself. Inter-
nal communication problems have also prevented the Commission from acting as a 
coherent force, and the result has sometimes been contradictory politics towards third 
parties (Duke, 2006b: 10). The adoption of an intergovernmental CFSP in 1992 only 
added to this complexity. Competition between four Commissioners in defining the 
Community’s profile in EU external relations made it difficult to shape the substance 
                                                 
37 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/94678.pdf 
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of the Commission’s ‘full association’ with the CFSP.38 A further contributory factor 
has been the difference in bureaucratic culture between the Commission and the 
Council (Duke, 2006a: 22).  
 
With the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission’s external relations structures were 
simplified with the creation of DG Relex. This DG was given responsibility for the 
planning and policy aspects of Community external relations, working in close con-
nection with the External Service (responsible for external delegations), Trade, De-
velopment, Enlargement, EuropAid, the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), and vari-
ous external aspects of Economic and Financial Affairs. However, the establishment 
of DG Relex did not really solve the coherence problem. The fact remains that there 
exist a broad range of instruments that contribute to civilian crisis management, that 
these are managed by several different DGs, and that there is no coordinating mecha-
nism. There have been a few modest attempts at streamlining the Commission’s ef-
forts in international crisis management, notably the establishment of Civil Protection 
Structures and the Advanced Planning Teams. While the former aim at coordinating 
interventions of national civil protection teams inside and outside the EU in case of a 
natural or technical disaster, the latter are intended to coordinate the external crisis 
management missions of the Commission.   
 
Within the ESDP structures, there has also been a need for structures to promote 
civil–military and inter-service coordination. This has led to the establishment of a 
Civil–Military Planning Cell and the Crisis Response Teams. The establishment of the 
Civil–Military Planning Cell is the EU’s first institutional innovation designed to pro-
vide a more integrated response to crisis management planning, whereas the Crisis 
Response Teams are a Council procedural innovation intended to promote inter-
service coordination.  
 
The challenge of coordinating EU crisis management policies is a grave one, charac-
terized by the broad range of activities involving various actors from the decision-
making processes to the implementation of policies. The growing number of cross-
                                                 
38 The Commission is represented at all levels in the CFSP decision making structures, from European 
Councils to working groups. It safeguards the EU Treaties and the acquis communitaire and ensures 
consistency of the action of the Union. 
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cutting issues, for instance, has increased the potential for disputes over competence 
between the Commission and Council. The question of competences involves many of 
the tools for crisis prevention, crisis management and resolution being developed by 
the Commission and within the CFSP/ESDP context. These challenges were identi-
fied in the European Security Strategy: ‘The challenge now is to bring together the 
different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the Euro-
pean Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and 
other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and that of third 
countries’ (European Council, 2003: 19). However, the question remains: how to 
combine the various instruments and capabilities?  
 
It is in the area of civilian crisis management that the challenge of coordination is par-
ticularly acute since both Council and Commission instruments can be used for simi-
lar actions. According to Gourlay (2004), the EU’s approach to crisis management has 
been ‘a self-limiting one, largely conducted within the intergovernmental framework 
of the ESDP, and institutionally divorced from EU activities that use European Com-
munity instruments’. She argues that the development of short-term crisis manage-
ment instruments has not built on the external relations acquis of the Commission, but 
instead followed a distinctly intergovernmental approach. The resultant shortfalls in 
relation to coordination between the Council and the Commission in crisis manage-
ment have led to an inefficient and fragmented approach to planning, deployment, 
mission support, training and recruitment for civilian crisis management operations 
(Gourlay, 2004: 420).  
 
In addition, the fact that there is no unified chain of command with regard to EU in-
struments for crisis response means that neither the Council nor the Commission has 
the necessary strategic oversight concerning all EU instruments (Gourlay, 2006a: 
112). There have been some efforts to provide a more integrated and coherent re-
sponses to crisis. While the Civil–Military Planning Cell is staffed by 25 individuals 
from the Military Staff and five from the Council Secretariat, the Commission has 
agreed to appoint two liaison officers to the Cell. Their primary function will be to 
‘promote coherence between the planning assumption of the EC and CFSP measures, 
and to identify practical arrangement for the use of military assets in support of civil-
ian Community programmes and ensure that… the preservation of the “humanitarian 
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space”  is properly taken into account’ (quoted in Gourlay, 2006a: 116). While the 
Civil–Military Cell is not a cross-pillar planning instrument, it has the potential to 
exert an important impact on the coherence of EU action. In addition, there are the 
Crisis Response Teams established by the Council. These ad hoc structures, com-
posed of senior officials from the Commission and the Council Secretariat, have been 
established to discuss the development of Crisis Management Concepts. The idea is 
that their deliberations will form the basis for ESDP operations decided by the PSC. 
In practice, however, the teams have not much impact on the planning of ESDP op-
erations since they are convened until a later stage in the planning process (Gourlay, 
2006a: 115). 
 
Otherwise, there have been few institutional innovations to promote coordination be-
tween the Council and the Commission. When such coordination has been achieved, 
this has often been in spite of rather than because of the EU’s structures. It has been 
characterized by informal working-level cooperation, and cross-representation of the 
Commission in CFSP structures and of member states in EC policy and programming 
processes (Gourlay, 2006a: 119).  
 
Towards coherence? 
With the establishment of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Pol-
icy, the Reform Treaty has provided for an important institutional change that may 
improve the coherence of the EU’s external action and security policy. The new fi-
nancial framework for 2007–2013 has also opened up for a more flexible system. The 
Instrument for Stability, for instance, is intended to deliver an effective, immediate 
and integrated response to crisis situations in third countries within a single legal in-
strument until normal cooperation under one of the other instruments for cooperation 
and assistance can resume. It remains to be seen, however, whether these changes are 
sufficient to solve the problems related to the EU’s coherence as a security actor. 
 
8. What does this tell us about the EU as a security actor? 
 
In order to be considered an actor, the EU has to have a set of political and adminis-
trative capabilities. The fact that the EU is best characterized as a system of multi-
level governance or as a post-modern security actor opens up for new forms of actor-
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ness. However, this paper has argued that certain political and administrative capabili-
ties are still necessary in order to be a coherent actor also in the field of security and 
defence. Based on a typology set forth by March and Olsen (1995), I have examined 
the development of four such capabilities: rights and authorities; resources (budget, 
staff, and equipment); competencies and knowledge and organizational skills. Let us 
now turn to the main conclusions of this study. 
 
First, it can be argued that the EU has developed a set of formal rights, institutions 
and rules to regulate this policy area, and that these have increased over time. How-
ever, the post-modern or multi-level character of this field means that the legal 
framework is characterized by a high level of complexity, which puts certain limits to 
the coherence of the EU as a security actor. On the other hand, this framework is con-
tinuously under revision. The recent adoption of a Reform Treaty and the establish-
ment of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as a 
single legal personality for the EU, will further strengthen the legal basis for this pol-
icy area. 
 
With regard to resources (budgets, staff and equipment), the overall conclusion is that 
the EU has limited but increasing resources in this sphere. It also seems valid to main-
tain that the EU still is primarily a civilian power. However, the picture is a bit more 
complex when it comes to the various different resources. Budgets are relatively lim-
ited compared to other policy areas and also compared to the ambitions expressed by 
the EU in the European Security Strategy and elsewhere. Moreover, the EU lacks 
emergency funds to act efficiently in relation to potential crises. On the other hand, 
the CFSP budget has increased gradually since 2002, and considerably since 2005. 
The financial framework for the period 2007–2013 also stipulates a 2.3% increase in 
the CFSP budget. In addition, we may add on other parts of the External Relations 
budget that are of particular relevance for civilian crisis management. From 2002 to 
2007 the actual CFSP budget soared, from €30 million to €200 million. But, while the 
budgets are increasing, the overall number of staff is decreasing. The Commission has 
a rather limited staff working with security policy (6–9% of the total). Moreover, the 
number of staff working on CFSP issues in the Commission was drastically halved in 
2002, but has remained stable since 2003. As to the General Secretariat in the Coun-
cil, the proportion of staff working with CFSP and ESDP issues is also modest (about 
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10%), but has increased considerably since 2002 in the policy units. As to equipment 
or military and civilian capabilities, several headline goals have been identified and 
partially achieved, even though some shortcomings remain in relation to pre-
determined headquarters for military operations, extraction forces and joint training 
and interoperability. Finally, the fact that the EU has undertaken/is undertaking four 
military operations and 15 civilian operations of various kinds shows that it cannot be 
dismissed as an unimportant actor in international crisis management.39 These figures 
also indicate that the EU is still primarily a civilian power, despite its ambition and 
potential to become an important military actor as well.   
 
The third capability perceived as necessary for actorness is competencies and knowl-
edge. The EU has developed a comprehensive approach to security, and has also es-
tablished various structures intended to improve its performance in implementing 
such an approach. The EU may learn from its member states and their experience 
from national security policies and multilateral cooperation in other arenas. Some of 
this expertise may be channelled through the committees and the working groups un-
der the Council and the expert groups under the Commission. However, we also note 
that the use of expert groups in this area has decreased considerably, contrary to the 
trend in other policy areas. One explanation might be that few countries have more 
experience than the Commission when it comes to comprehensive security and civil-
ian crisis management, so that in this case it is the member states that learn from the 
EU. This may also explain why the EU has established its own instructional and train-
ing facilities at the EU level, including a defence college and the organization of crisis 
management exercises.  
 
The most important shortcomings are to be found in relation to the EU’s organizing 
skills or ability. The multi-level character of the EU makes it difficult to overcome 
some of the institutional barriers. For instance, there are overlapping competencies 
between the Council and the Commission in relation to civilian crisis management. 
Without a common chain of command, neither the Commission nor the Council has 
the necessary strategic oversight of all EU instruments. In addition, member states 
have their own individual activities in both civilian and military crisis management. 
                                                 
39 For a full overview of ongoing and completed operations: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/ 
showPage.asp?id =268&lang=en&mode=g 
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Thus, there is a great potential for streamlining EU action in this field. Some of the 
problems might be solved by establishing a High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, to hold the position of both HR CFSP and the Commissioner for 
External Relations, as proposed in the Reform Treaty. Still, there is reason to believe 
that the reluctance of member states to transfer sovereignty to the EU in this area will 
continue to be the biggest challenge that must be overcome if the EU is to become a 
coherent security actor. 
 
The post-modern or multi-level character of the EU has important consequences for 
how it works as a security actor. While opening up for new, and perhaps more suit-
able, forms of security approaches (such as comprehensive security), the many levels 
(actors and institutions) as well as limited resources make it difficult for the EU to act 
as a coherent security actor. While this may not be impossible, it will certainly require 
a heightened focus on coordination among the many different institutions and levels 
of the European Union.  
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ønsker Internasjonal politikk å være helt i front med å utforske denne utviklingen. Tidsskriftet publiserer 
fagartikler, debatt og essays både fra Norge og nabolandene.
Abonnement: NOK 360 | abonnement utenfor Norden: NOK 480 | løssalg: NOK 115 porto/postal charge 
Nordisk Øst·forum kommer ﬁre ganger i året og er det ledende skandinaviskspråk-lige 
tidsskriftet på sitt felt. Tidsskriftets ambisjon er å dekke politisk og samfunnsmessig utvikling i en region 
i stadig rask endring – Sentral- og Øst-Europa og det postsovjetiske området. Tidsskriftet opererer med 
fagfellevurdering og publiserer fagartikler, essays og bokomtaler.
Abonnement studenter: NOK 285 | abonnement privatpersoner: NOK 350 | institusjoner: NOK 470 
enkelthefter: NOK 115 porto/postal charge
Hvor hender det? er artikkelserien som – i konsentrert og forenklet form – gir deg økt innsikt i 
internasjonale spørsmål. I mange sammenhenger har vi behov for kortfattet framstilling av konﬂikter og 
samarbeid, prosesser, utfordringer og utviklingstrekk i det internasjonale samfunnet. HHD fyller dette 
behovet. HHD ﬁnner du også på Internett – nær 150 artikler fra tidligere årganger, men aldri inneværende 
årgang. 
Gruppeabonnement (10 eller ﬂere): NOK 80/ab. | enkeltabonnement: NOK 290 | enkeltabonnement utenfor Norge: 400 
Forum for Development Studies har i mange år vært Norges ledende tidsskrift innenfor 
utviklingsforskning. I senere år har det mer systematisk henvendt seg til beslektede miljøer i Norden med 
sikte på å bli et Oslo-basert internasjonalt tidsskrift. Siktemålet er å forbedre kvaliteten på norsk og nordisk 
forskning på utvikling, nord-sør-forhold og bistand. Samtidig ønsker redaksjonen å formidle resultater fra 
forskningen og stimulere til debatt.
Abonnement: NOK 250 | abonnement utenfor Norden: NOK 330 | løssalg: NOK 140 porto/postal charge
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